Foundation of Algorithmic Mechanism Design
GI-Dagstuhl-Seminar
"Game-theoretic Analyses of the Internet"

Reinder B. Lok * Sascha Wolf †

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*Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands; e-mail: r.lok@ke.unimaas.nl.

†Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands; e-mail: s.wolf@ke.unimaas.nl.

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