Prof. Emo Welzl and Prof. Bernd Gärtner
|Mittagsseminar Talk Information|
Date and Time: Thursday, July 20, 2006, 12:15 pm
Duration: This information is not available in the database
Location: CAB G51
Speaker: Felix Fischer (Univ. of Munich)
Strategic games may exhibit symmetry in a variety of ways. A common aspect, enabling the succinct representation of games when the number of players is unbounded, is that players can not or need not distinguish between the other players. In this talk, we investigate four classes of symmetric games obtained by considering two additional properties: identical payoff functions for all players and the ability to distinguish oneself from the other players. We show that pure Nash equilibria can be found efficiently in all four classes if only a constant number of actions is available to each player, a problem that is intractable for other succinct representations of multi-player games. We further show that identical payoff functions simplify the search for equilibria, while a growing number of actions renders it intractable.
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